How American and British Visions for Southeast Asia Evolved in Crisis and Framed Escalation in Vietnam (1961–1964)

Abstract:

My thesis looks at how America’s regional strategy in Southeast Asia evolved in the years leading up to the 1965 escalation of the Vietnam War. Paying special attention to the idea of credibility and the role played by Anglo-American relationship, I first trace how President Kennedy and his advisors formulated a progressive Cold War vision in the aftermath of the 1961 Laotian crisis. Meanwhile, Britain restrained US policy and looked toward Malaysia as a means of sustaining its ability to do so. I argue that Kennedy’s strategy came to rest on Vietnam and Indonesia, both of which presented apparent successes through 1962. Meanwhile, Britain quietly pursued an independent line but came into conflict with American policy by 1963 as Indonesia sought to undermine Malaysia. As crises in both Vietnam and Indonesia escalated, I argue that President Johnson abandoned Kennedy’s strategy while retaining his assumptions and that instead of restraining him, Britain tied Vietnam and Malaysia together in the minds of US policymakers. In that way, by the summer of 1964 Johnson and his advisors had little regional vision, but rather a series of relatively unfounded assumptions which framed and strongly influenced their decision to escalate in Vietnam.