Citation:
Date Presented:
February 5Abstract:
In 2009, El Salvador’s Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)—by most measures the strongest conservative party to emerge from Latin America’s Third Wave of democratization—experienced the first major schism in its long history. The split marked a transformative moment that resulted in the formation of a new conservative party, reshaped the logic of electoral competition in El Salvador, and triggered an unprecedented period of programmatic realignment within ARENA. At the very core of these events are a series of unanswered questions in comparative politics: What explains variations in party cohesion across space and time? Why do parties experience sudden (and not so sudden) schisms? How can we build cohesive, long-lasting political parties? In response to these puzzles, my thesis presents an institutional theory of conservative party schisms. It argues that variations in party cohesion and schism can best be explained by what I call power-sharing institutions: the rules and procedures that structure intra-party competition for power and resources. While certain types of power-sharing institutions are conducive to high levels of cohesion in the short term, those same institutions are more likely to result in schisms in the long run. The theory may have a number of implications for the study party-building, intra-party politics, institutional design, and institutional change.